UK Indications and Warning Gauging the Iraqi Threat to Kuwait in the 1960s
Gauging the Iraqi Threat to Kuwait in the 1960s
Between 1958, when Abdul Karim Qasim seized power in
Iraq, and the expiration of the United Kingdom’s formal
defense commitment to Kuwait in 1971, Britain’s Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC) was charged with providing
warning of potential hostile action by Iraq. The JIC possessed
relatively few collection assets, a fact that increased the
challenge of keeping the Foreign Office and the War Office
well informed about the persistently volatile situation in the
Persian Gulf. Britain moved forces into Kuwait in June 1961
(Operation Vantage) in response to Iraqi threats, and tensions
continued to ebb and flow in succeeding years.
The UK’s defense of Kuwait is chronicled in an extensive
collection of documents, many only recently declassified.
These papers portray a responsive intelligence system,
despite collection limitations and the amount of time it took to
redirect assets. The documents illustrate the difficulty of
monitoring idiosyncratic leaders and UK frustration with
human source intelligence and “bazaar rumors” that could
not be corroborated by technical means. Despite these
problems, the record shows JIC Assessments to be well
crafted and credible. They appear to have had a compelling
effect on UK contingency planning and force readiness
posture against Iraq throughout the 1960s.[1]
Setting the Scene
The Anglo-Kuwait Treaty of 1899 governed relations between
London and Kuwait until 1961. This treaty forbade the
introduction of other foreign diplomats into Kuwait or Kuwaiti
territorial concessions without British concurrence. The
agreement implied military protection in return for Kuwait’s
allowing the UK to conduct Kuwaiti foreign relations.
An exchange of letters in June 1961 between Shaikh
Abdullah III and Sir William Luce, the United Kingdom’s
Political Resident, redefined the international relationship. At
that time, the UK explicitly agreed to provide military
assistance to Kuwait should the ruling family request it. This
defense agreement remained the driver for UK contingency
planning until it lapsed in May 1971, although in the interim
Britain persuaded the Kuwaiti Government to accept
modifications to the form of its military response.
[2]
Iraq was unstable between 1958 and 1971. Ruling uneasily
since seizing power in 1958, Qasim reacted quickly and with
vitriol to the Anglo-Kuwaiti exchange of letters in 1961. Until
Qasim was killed during a coup in 1963, strident Iraqi rhetoric
convinced Whitehall that it did not dare rule out the threat of
Iraqi invasion. Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations improved following
Qasim’s death, but the UK remained attuned to sudden
possible shifts. Qasim’s successor, Abdul Salam, died in a
helicopter accident in April 1966. His brother, Abdul Rahman
Aref, governed until he was killed in the Baathist coup of July
1968. Despite Baghdad’s constant expansionist rhetoric,
internal rivalries fostered an inward focus. Political tensions
encouraged Iraqi leaders to retain forces in Baghdad, and a
Kurdish rebellion tied down much of the rest of the Iraqi
army.[3]
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csistudies/studies/fall_winter_2001/graphics/persiangulf2.jpg/
image.jpg) Click map to enlarge.
London relied upon the JIC to orchestrate national level
intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.
Comprising senior members of the Foreign Office (later
Foreign and Commonwealth Office), the War Office (later
Ministry of Defence), and the Treasury, and the heads of the
three intelligence and security agencies, the JIC was the sole
source of finished all-source estimates regarding Iraqi and
Kuwaiti capabilities and intentions. These were similar to
National Intelligence Estimates in the United States.[4] A
typical long-term JIC Assessment on Iraq might include one
or two pages of conclusions for senior readership and then—
in a lengthy annex—a fleshing out of methodology, collection
issues, and detailed political, economic, and military
estimates on Iraq. These were issued irregularly until the UK
intervention in Kuwait in 1961. At that point, the military
requested an update on Iraqi intentions every four to six
weeks, although within a year production shifted to a semi-
annual schedule. JIC Assessments invariably addressed likely
Iraqi attack scenarios and associated warning times. As such,
they provided input into the UK’s contingency planning and
influenced the alert posture for forces committed to defend
Kuwait.[5] [Top of page]
British Interests in the Region
Between mid-1958 and mid- 1961, JIC Assessments focused
on the dangers of internal instability in Kuwait and Iraq and
the likely reaction of other countries in the region to a
possible UK intervention. Whitehall’s greatest fear was that
domestic unrest, primarily in Kuwait but also in Iraq, could
endanger the flow of oil to the United Kingdom.
Consequently, UK military planning focused on intervention
to protect oil fields.[6]
To support military contingency planning, the JIC also
addressed Iraq’s ability to invade Kuwait, but its reports
clearly and repeatedly discounted the likelihood of
aggression. Such scenarios did not drive UK military planning
at that time. Shortly after Qasim’s coup in 1958, the JIC
assessed that the new regime would be neutralist and closely
associated with the United Arab Republic (UAR). Although it
would “no doubt maintain Iraqi claims” to Kuwait, the JIC
concluded that Qasim was unlikely to invade. Rather, the
Iraqis would pin their hopes on subversion from within
Kuwait.[7] However, the JIC doubted even this scenario.
Members judged that a US Special National Intelligence
Estimate of the time overstated the danger of instability in
Kuwait. UK analysts believed that the Iraqi revolution had
“considerable impact” in Kuwait, but they judged that the
Kuwaiti royal family was determined to avoid a similar fate.[8]
Although it would “no doubt maintain
Iraqi claims” to Kuwait, the JIC concluded
that Qasim was unlikely to invade.
After evaluating the capability of the Kuwaitis to sabotage
their own oilfields and assessing conditions under which the
UK might feel compelled to intervene in Iraq, the JIC turned
its attention back to the Iraq-Kuwait equation.[9] In March
1959, UK military planners asked the JIC to discuss how Iraq
might invade Kuwait; they explicitly stated that the paper was
not to assess the likelihood of invasion.[10] In the resulting
study, the JIC concluded that an Iraqi invasion force would
comprise no more than two brigade groups and an armored
regiment of perhaps 70 tanks. Some 300 paratroopers might
participate, although this was unlikely. The attack would
receive moderate air support, which would quickly become
slight. The inability to properly service aircraft, armor, and
motor transport was likely to be high. Either the Soviets or
the UAR might provide materiel and advisory support to the
invasion. Finally, the JIC touched upon warning: “[Her
Majesty’s Government] may expect to receive not less than
four days’ warning of the assembly of an invasion force in the
Basrah area, but, once this is assembled, she could expect
little or no warning of an actual invasion.”[11]
Although characterizing its assessment as solely a military
capability study, the JIC also opined, “We believe the
possibility of an Iraqi attack on Kuwait will remain unlikely up
to the end of 1960, whatever the complexion of Iraq’s
government.” Hedging its bets, however, the JIC again noted
that Baghdad would “no doubt maintain its territorial claim
against Kuwait.”[12]
Responding to further requirements from the Joint Planning
Staff and elsewhere, the JIC produced another long-term
assessment of Iraq in March 1961—some three months
before the UK military intervention. This assessment again
devoted only a few lines to the likelihood of invasion during
the next year given the lack of anti-Kuwait rhetoric coming
from Baghdad. The JIC concluded that the Iraqi Army was
capable of little more than an internal security role. Moreover,
the JIC noted that Qasim was attempting to foster a general
improvement of inter-Arab relations and was unlikely to
reverse this policy just when he was beginning to achieve
success.
Significantly, however, the JIC study pointed out that
government decisionmaking in Iraq centered around Qasim,
who suffered “from a lack of mental balance, which makes
his actions unpredictable and gives many who meet him the
impression that he is verging on madness.”[13]
The March 1961 assessment painted a detailed picture of the
Iraqi military establishment. The Army comprised
approximately
60,000 troops, manning an armored (4th Armored) and four
infantry divisions (1st, 2nd, 5th Infantry Divisions and the 2nd
Mountain Infantry Division) stationed in central and northern
Iraq. Iraq also boasted a parachute unit of 550 personnel.
Only the 15th Independent Brigade Group was stationed
near Kuwait. Approximately 75 percent of army equipment
was of Soviet origin. The Army had 260 Soviet-designed T-34
and T-54 tanks—more than half of its armor—and another 15
US/UK-origin tanks. Soviet equipment also included 300 to
400 armored personnel carriers, 120 SU-100 self-propelled
guns, and 400 field and anti-tank guns. Despite this influx of
equipment, the JIC noted that army readiness was hindered
by a lack of trained officers and combat experience, weak
logistics, and the multiplicity of arms sources. These
problems would plague the Iraqi Army throughout the
The Army comprised approximately
1960s.[14]
The Air Force and Navy contributed little to the threat
equation. The Iraqi Air Force had a squadron of IL-28 Beagle
bombers, two squadrons of MiG-17s, and two squadrons of
British Hunters and Venoms. It had begun to integrate
MiG-19s. The combat aircraft were based in central and
northern Iraq. The JIC assessed that the air force had a
“moderate” capability in its primary role of army support.
Overall air defense capabilities were “indifferent” due to the
lack of experienced pilots and trained radar operators. The
Navy comprised nine ex-Soviet P-6 patrol boats and four
river gunboats. Six of the P-6s routinely operated in the Gulf.
While not speaking highly of the Navy, the JIC later
presciently warned of the potential danger of mining by
dhows or similar small craft and torpedo attacks by fast patrol
boats.[15]
[Top of page]
Heightened Alert
Alarming reports from the region in mid-1961 changed the
picture overnight. By 25 June, Iraq had begun to harshly
criticize the recent Anglo-Kuwaiti exchange of letters on
defense. Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, the UK Ambassador in
Baghdad, and his military attaché issued several reports that
suggested Iraq was preparing to move armor from Baghdad
south toward Kuwait.[16] The Foreign Office reported on 1
July that evidence received from a number of sources over
the previous few days suggested that armor and additional
infantry were moving south from Baghdad. It cited
preparations for movement of armor to Al Basrah (first
reported 27 June); administrative steps for “warlike
operations”; concentration of railway flats and/or transporters
in Baghdad; and (on 30 June) southward movement of armor
by rail and road. [17]
Qasim has committed himself publicly and irrevocably to
declaration that Kuwait is to be incorporated into Iraq….
Sir Humphrey subsequently wrote that the UK also received
reports that the Iraqi Minister of Housing had been directed
to visit Kuwait to draw up plans for housing there. The Iraqi
Government had cancelled leave for a senior Finance
Ministry official who was then called in to prepare a revised
budget incorporating Kuwait. A senior officer of an Iraqi
armored regiment visited Al Basrah to arrange
accommodations for the regiment. Iraq created a task force,
designated its commander, and moved advance parties from
several divisions south to Al Basrah. Finally, Sir Humphrey
claimed that the military had requisitioned railway wagons.
[18]
Becoming increasingly concerned about a possible invasion,
Great Britain heightened its alert status on 28 June. The
following day, the UK’s Political Resident for the Persian Gulf
sent an alarming message:
Qasim has committed himself publicly and irrevocably to
declaration that Kuwait is to be incorporated into Iraq…. He is
in the process of moving an armored regiment to Basrah area
where an infantry brigade is already stationed. He will be in
position to attack Kuwait within the next three days…. We are
dealing with an unbalanced man whose actions are
unpredictable. We conclude threat to
Kuwait’s independence is as grave and imminent as it could
be, and that we are already within four days’ warning period
envisaged in
Vantage Plan.[19]
Taking fast-moving developments into account, the JIC
produced a series of intelligence assessments that convinced
Whitehall the risk of invasion was high and Iraq might attack
with virtually no warning. These assessments precipitated the
dispatch of British military units to Kuwait—Operation
Vantage—during July 1961.
(/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/
csistudies/studies/fall_winter_2001/graphics/siraq2.jpg/
image.jpg) Click map to enlarge.
With troops on the ground and with analysis pointing to hours
instead of days of advance notice, the JIC took steps to
significantly increase intelligence collection to enhance
warning. It also notified its heads of section to be available for
recall to work with little notice.[20]
The decision to intervene remained controversial because
the United Kingdom acted even though evidently unable to
corroborate human intelligence reports with other
intelligence sources. UK photoreconnaissance missions did
not locate the armored regiment for at least several weeks
after Operation Vantage started. By 3 July, six days after the
initial human intelligence warnings, RAF Canberra PR 9
aircraft were routinely flying photoreconnaissance missions
along the Iraq-Kuwait border; however, severe haze often
degraded the Canberras’ oblique imaging range and the
missions failed to find the tanks. In mid-August 1961, the JIC
would only say that the reports of the movement of the
armored regiment to Ad Diwaniyah south of Baghdad had not
been confirmed. Sir Humphrey opined that the Iraqi task
force had turned back into the interior.[21] [Top of page]
Adjusting Warning Indicators
With the intervention accomplished, the Joint Planning Group
requested an entirely new, comprehensive assessment of the
Iraqi threat to Kuwait. More than just an order of battle review,
this time the study was to pay “special attention to factors like
training and morale.” On 18 August 1961, the JIC issued its
report, “Iraqi Threat to Kuwait during the Next Twelve
Months.” The assessment concluded that Qasim would
invade when he believed that invasion would help him silence
domestic opponents and retain power by providing a “rapid
and resounding” success abroad. UK withdrawal before the
anticipated arrival of Arab
League forces would tempt Qasim to attack quickly.[22]
The JIC paper addressed Iraqi attack capabilities. In a worst-
case scenario, it judged that the largest invasion force would
comprise an infantry division, an armored brigade (177 tanks)
and a parachute unit. Armor would lead on a broad front
astride two roads and attempt to seize the Jal az Zaur
escarpment, which covered the approach to Kuwait town.
Light forces or supporting formations from Baghdad might
advance east from Al Busayyah to outflank the escarpment
from the south. Because most of these assets were based
well away from the border, the JIC still hoped that the UK
Embassy in Baghdad could provide four days of warning.[23]
The JIC also addressed a much smaller invasion scenario
that afforded no warning. If Iraq were to invade with only the
forces currently deployed in the south, it could use an
infantry brigade and possibly an armored regiment moved to
Ad Diwaniyah, a facility located approximately 200 miles by
rail to the northwest of Al Basrah. The brigade could move on
good roads at night and “concentrate” near Basrah. From
there, the brigade would also cross into Kuwait at night. The
mini-invasion could thus occur without “visual warning,”
although several hours would elapse between when the
ground forces crossed the border and when they would
arrive in Kuwait town.[24]
The Iraqi Air Force would support these ground assaults by
bombing the airfields in Kuwait and then providing close air
support to the advancing ground forces. The JIC concluded
that these attacks would be “moderate initially but quickly
become slight.” It warned that Beagle bombers might strike
Bahrain airfield, one of the British Royal Air Force’s (RAF’s)
two bases in the Gulf, but would be unlikely to “neutralize” it.
[25]
To guide collection, the JIC developed lists of indicators
based on these warning scenarios. Although the lists
themselves are unavailable, the August JIC paper identified
key events in the invasion scenarios and evaluated UK ability
to collect against them. The paper focused primarily on what
members of the British Embassy in Baghdad might observe.
Although the paper optimistically stated that “codeword
material” might provide information regarding “major
preparatory military moves and/or military/air states of alert,”
the bottom line was discouraging. The United Kingdom could
expect no “visual warning” of a brigade-level attack from Ad
Diwaniyah or points south. If an armored regiment from
Baghdad reinforced the brigade, London might be lucky
enough to get 24 hours of warning if Iraq failed to mask the
deployment.[26]
A larger attack force would require the redeployment of
several units from Baghdad. In this case, the British Embassy
might be able to give four days’ warning of the arrival of these
units along the southern border. However, the Embassy’s
collection effort might be confounded by Iraqi travel
restrictions or by prior movement of the units to exercise
areas. Alternatively, the JIC postulated that, to reduce
detection, Iraq might be willing to risk a substantial delay in
the arrival of its second echelon forces— and might not
begin to move the units from Baghdad until after the Ad
Diwaniyah brigade crossed the border.[27]
Collection against preparations for an air strike would fare
little better. The JIC observed that the Iraqi Air Force might
reduce flight activity as a precursor to attack. If Iraqi security
measures “permitted,” the UK air attaché might be able to
provide two to three days of warning of impending air
operations in this scenario.[28]
Sensitive to rumors of a revolt in the Iraqi army as well as to
Iraqi troop movements, the JIC remained skittish as British
forces began withdrawing from Kuwait in July and an Arab
League force prepared to move in. By September, the JIC
decided to consider other indicators of Iraqi intent during the
UK withdrawal. The ones used “so far” were insufficient to be
a guide for forces in the field.[29]
[Top of page]
Photoreconnaissance and
Political Sensitivities
The declassified record shows a major emphasis on planning
for timely photoreconnaissance to corroborate human
intelligence reports. Even before Operation Vantage, the UK
had developed plans to fly Canberra photoreconnaissance
missions into Iraqi airspace as far north as Al Basrah. In
January 1960, the UK assumed it would have four days’
warning if the Iraqis attempted to prepare for an attack by
moving forces from Baghdad to Basrah. The Air Ministry
offered the Chiefs of Staff a plan to virtually blanket southern
Iraq with Canberra photoreconnaissance coverage if the UK
received such warning. The planners assumed that night
movement was unlikely given the Iraqi Army’s unfamiliarity
with large-scale night operations, particularly in that area.
This dovetailed with the Staff’s conviction that the Iraqis
would be unlikely to detect Canberras flying high level
daylight missions. With low probability of Iraqi detection, the
Air Ministry hoped that the Foreign Office would find the
missions acceptable. The Staff expected aircrews to observe
southbound movement of concentrations of Iraqi troops. The
film was to be interpreted in Bahrain within two and a half
hours of time over target. A force of three Canberras flying
from Bahrain could provide a minimum of four daylight
sorties per day—a figure deemed adequate for warning of
major moves south from Al
Basrah.[30]
Running the reconnaissance flights, however, proved
politically tricky. The RAF had flown the initial such flight
during Operation Vantage in July 1961, but only after gaining
special ministerial approval and flying under tightly controlled
conditions. The JIC seemed satisfied with mission results. In
October 1961, the JIC proposed another reconnaissance
flight over Iraq to locate the apparently wandering southern
armored regiment. According to the Chiefs of Staff, the
presence of this regiment between Al Basrah and Az Zubayr
“dominates our thinking and planning.” Members of the JIC,
however, had to overcome working-level Foreign Office
“misgivings about political embarrassment.” Ultimately, the
Foreign Office polled the regional ambassadors before
concurring with the proposal. By 9 November 1961, the JIC
reported that the “recently” flown reconnaissance mission
over Al Basrah had allowed the Ministry of Defense to adjust
military readiness. The RAF also proposed to fly long-range
oblique reconnaissance missions east of Basrah outside Iraqi
air space.[31]
Even with the additional imagery, enhancing overall collection
against Iraq was a prolonged process. Over three and a half
months after initiating Operation Vantage, the JIC
commented that “every possible effort is being made to
improve our intelligence coverage of the area, but the buildup
of this coverage takes time.”[32]
Responding to HUMINT reporting that prompted renewed
invasion fears in December 1961, the JIC proposed
additional reconnaissance missions over southern Iraq. The
United Kingdom had no evidence of air defense capabilities
in southern Iraq. The RAF assessed the risk of detection to
be very slight, and that of identification and interception
remote.[33] The benign air defense environment probably
increased chances of approval. Again with ministerial
concurrence, a probable Canberra flew a mission on 23
December 1961. The results from the flight convinced the
JIC that “most of the alarmist reports” about Iraqi military
intentions could be discounted. Second and third flights were
approved for late December, but ultimately not flown. [34]
The substantial lag between the time of the initial alarming
HUMINT reports and the Canberra’s time over target
handicapped the intelligence effort. The approval process to
fly the missions required at least 24 hours. Given the
proximity of Iraqi forces to Kuwait, the JIC wanted much
faster response from a trusted collector such as the
Canberra. The JIC concluded that methods of obtaining
intelligence “within our control” would be more reliable.
Writing to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of the Cabinet
railed against having to rely on the soft, uncorroborated
reporting that had prompted renewed tensions in December
1961. “It seems inevitable,” he underscored, “that we shall
continue to get alarmist bazaar rumors of Qasim’s intentions
and if we are to avoid politically embarrassing and
unnecessary and expensive military movements we must
have means to confirm or reject such reports.”[35]
To enhance the timeliness of imagery collection, the JIC
requested that the UK Political Resident for the Persian Gulf
be delegated the authority to authorize one reconnaissance
flight over Iraq should he have indications of an impending
attack. A single aircraft flying at 30,000 feet or above would
enter no more than 55 miles into Iraqi airspace. Time over
Iraq would be approximately 20 minutes. If the aircraft was
making a contrail, the pilot was to turn back. The proposal
noted that there was no evidence of an air defense capability
in the south and the risk of detection was slight.[36]
The Prime Minister approved the request on 9 February
1962. This dispensation was so sensitive that it required his
reapproval every 90 days. Fortunately, Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations
calmed sufficiently that, from January 1962 to as late as May
1964,
Canberras were not dispatched to overfly Iraq at the behest
of either Whitehall or the Political Resident. Reconnaissance
flights along Iraq’s periphery were sufficient, and these were
reduced to biweekly intervals by 1964. Great Britain
continued to fly missions along the Iraq-Kuwait border until at
least May 1968.[37] [Top of page]
Developing Invasion Scenarios
Warning is an iterative process in which attack scenarios,
indicator lists, and collection strategies evolve in relation to
one another. Throughout the treaty period, the JIC frequently
updated its estimates of Iraqi intentions and capabilities. In
November 1961, the Chiefs of Staff advised the JIC that the
issue of warning time and the associated determination
whether or not to keep UK forces at a high state of alert had
“wide ramifications.” They asked the JIC for a thorough scrub
of Iraqi military capabilities, invasion timelines, and prospects
for London and the theater commander receiving indications
of attack. This time, the military wanted the JIC to assess the
likelihood of attack in addition to Iraq’s capability to attack.
[38]
Responding on 23 November 1961, the JIC issued another
major estimate in which it further revised its Iraqi attack
scenarios. It concluded that there was no doubt as to Qasim’s
long-term intention to seize Kuwait “should the opportunity
arise.” The JIC also warned that we “must expect him to try
to mislead us.” The paper then assessed three possible Iraqi
courses of action:
A “full scale deliberate attack” with a minimum force of one
infantry division and one armored brigade, which would
require at least four days to move forces from central and
southern Iraq to a concentration area close to the Iraq-Kuwait
border.
A “surprise attack” to be undertaken by the forces on hand
near Kuwait, with no advance ground movements or changes
in Air Force deployments or training, but with reinforcements
from Baghdad and Ad Diwaniyah joining the attack once it
was underway.
An “opportunist operation”—the likeliest scenario—that
would occur with virtually no warning and involve only
ground forces on hand between Al Basrah and Az Zubayr in
the south, which could concentrate for offensive operations
undetected in less than 24 hours, and perhaps air support.
Such action might follow subversion in Kuwait, the break-up
of the Arab League Force then based in Kuwait, or an
“obvious reduction” in UK ability to intervene. Although the
attack force would still require several hours to reach vital
objectives in central Kuwait, the JIC warned that “we cannot
rely on any warning” in either this scenario or that of the
surprise attack.[39]
In 1962, the JIC reassessed the warning times associated
with these scenarios. For the first time, it explicitly stated that
no Iraqi attack would occur without armor; moreover, Iraq
would require more time than earlier estimated to transport
its armor to the border because it had moved its tanks north
from Ad Diwaniyah and southern Iraq. The JIC assessed that
at least an armored regiment would participate in the
“surprise” and “opportunist” attack scenarios. Since the
armor was now located in Baghdad and points north, the JIC
concluded that London would receive at least 28 hours
warning between when Iraqi armor started moving and when
it reached the border with Kuwait. At the other extreme,
indications of a full-scale deliberate attack— a less likely
scenario—could appear as much as seven days before an
invasion. The ongoing Kurdish campaign had sharply
reduced the force availability and operational readiness
required for action against Kuwait.[40]
Citing the latest JIC Assessment, the Chief of Defence Staff
summarized the conclusions for the Prime Minister in March
1962.
He noted that Iraq still was handicapped by lack of army
training and had no armor in the south. Moreover, UK
intelligence on Iraq had improved. Stating that Qasim would
not attack without armor, he also concluded that the military
expected seven days’ notice for a full-scale attack and 28
hours of warning for the “opportunist” scenario.[41]
The JIC repeated this line in November 1962. By then, Iraq
had deployed the equivalent of two infantry divisions (with
medium artillery and armor) to deal with the Kurds in the
north and all armor remained in or north of Baghdad. The JIC
still judged, therefore, that Great Britain would have 28 hours
of warning. It cautioned, however, that if the tanks moved to
the south, the UK would lose its key warning indicator of
invasion. A mini-invasion force could cross the border
undetected.[42]
These basic attack scenarios dominated UK assessments of
Iraq throughout the 1960s, although judgments regarding
intentions and capabilities varied. Qasim’s overthrow and the
signing of the Iraq-Kuwait accord in the fall of 1963
diminished the likelihood of a cold-blooded calculated attack.
The JIC accordingly shifted its emphasis to a scenario of
invasion precipitated by instability in Kuwait. Although the
1960s were characterized by a flood of Soviet weapons into
Iraq, the JIC actually reduced its assessment of Iraqi
readiness to move against Kuwait as time wore on because
Baghdad’s forces were committed to a protracted, set-piece
struggle in Kurdistan. Even the tiny proportion of forces
deployed in the south was occasionally ordered north.
[Top of page]
Post “Vantage” Warning Challenges
The intelligence picture was not in clear focus when tensions
rose at the end of 1961, but the JIC leaned forward to fulfill
its warning responsibilities. On 21 December, it stated that
Kuwaiti military sources had detected indications of an
impending Iraqi ground assault against Kuwait. Although
noting the key source had often been unreliable, the JIC
summarized the reporting, which included references to
preparation for a large exercise to be held in southern Iraq
from 23 to 25 December; small arms shipments to Al Basrah;
an Iraqi request to move railway cars between Ad Diwaniyah,
An Nasiriyah, and Al Basrah; and Iraqi air activity near Kuwait.
[43] Lending more credence to reporting than was perhaps
warranted, the Cabinet Office sent a flash precedence report
to the operating forces on 26 December summarizing a JIC
Assessment that Iraq had moved a substantial number of
paratroopers from Baghdad to Al Basrah on 24 or 25
December.[44] The UK Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ) had detected anomalies in Iraqi
ground communications on 22 December but these were
insufficient to provide a convincing case for invasion.[45] The
UK Ambassador in Baghdad, however, discounted the
interpretation that troop movements were related to training,
asserting that a large exercise involving the 3rd and 4th
Divisions could not be carried out because the units were
widely dispersed and the Iraqi Army had little experience in
carrying out division-level exercises.[46] Unable to
corroborate or discount the reporting, the UK ordered the
previously mentioned Canberra reconnaissance missions
over and around southern Iraq.[47] Meanwhile, the Political
Resident remained skeptical that Iraq could have flown
paratroopers to the south undetected, citing the lack of
activity noted by the consulate in Al Basrah,
photoreconnaissance missions flown from Bahrain, and
radars in Kuwait that monitored southern Iraq.[48]
Washington did not share London’s faith in reporting that
suggested an assault was imminent. On 29 December, the
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs wrote, “The intelligence items on which the
British acted did not seem to us to indicate any real
danger…. We are inclined to believe that it would be
extremely difficult for Qasim to launch a surprise attack on
Kuwait.” In view of the potential adverse effects of yet another
British intervention in Kuwait, he recommended that the
United States advise the British of the “sharp cleavage
between our estimate of the imminence of an attack and
theirs.”[49]
The next major warning challenge occurred nearly two years
later, when Iraq began moving an armored regiment south to
Al Basrah, according to reporting of 7 December 1963. UK
forces committed to defending Kuwait had lowered their alert
status during 1963 as a result of optimistic JIC assessments
regarding Iraqi intentions and the lowered state of Iraqi
military readiness in the south.[50] The JIC initially evaluated
the armored regiment as having substandard operational
capability, low morale, and potentially dubious loyalty. Further
reducing perceptions of military readiness in the south, much
of the 15th infantry brigade previously stationed there had
deployed northward. The JIC assessed that any attack would
require the return of the infantry brigade followed by a
“considerable” period of training. It also judged an attack
unlikely because Baghdad remained preoccupied with
internal power struggles and because Kuwait appeared calm
domestically.[51]
Nevertheless, given its significance for reduced warning time,
the southward armor move raised several flags. The JIC
revised and distributed a new list of indicators of an Iraqi
attack on Kuwait and attempted to boost collection. The UK
retained a Canberra in Bahrain despite earlier plans to return
it to Cyprus, and the Air Ministry was to be asked to consider
providing a second. Short of Arab linguists, the GCHQ
sought to obtain additional Arab linguists from elsewhere in
the government.[52] To supplement photoreconnaissance,
the Ministry of Defense sought vital reporting on the state of
Kuwaiti internal affairs, particularly any indications of
dissension in the royal family.[53]
The presence of armor so far south increased the JIC’s
apprehension when Iraq and Egypt conducted a publicized
ground exercise in southern Iraq in 1964. In late September,
the British Embassy in Kuwait advised the Kuwaiti Chief of
Staff that Iraq was preparing to conduct exercises, including
armored participants from Az Zubayr, along the Kuwaiti
border. Although he did not believe an attack was likely, the
Commander in Chief, British Forces Middle East, reported he
would “unobtrusively” increase the state of alert in the Gulf.
This included arranging for a second Canberra
reconnaissance aircraft in Bahrain. Not viewing the
maneuvers as “anything sinister,” the Kuwaitis nevertheless
stepped up intelligence collection against Iraq. They doubled
the number of personnel assigned to their communications
intelligence watch monitoring Iraqi elements in Al Basrah.
The Kuwaiti Air Force also conducted routine surveillance
flights along the frontier.[54]
[Top of page]
Reassessing Triggers for Invasion
Although UK analysts and military planners increasingly
judged Iraq to be internally preoccupied and unlikely to
invade its neighbor, they nevertheless feared a scenario in
which internal instability in Kuwait might “tempt” Baghdad to
intervene. In December 1963, with reports of armor moving
south, the Chairman of the JIC advised the Chiefs of Staff
that “the only factor which might lead the Iraqis to take overt
action in Kuwait would be if circumstances arose in Kuwait
which led the Iraqis to believe that they could arrive there
unopposed before we could intervene.” He continued, “It is,
therefore, most important that the situation in Kuwait is kept
under constant surveillance and HM ambassador there has
been asked to take particular care to report anything that
might give an indication of internal troubles.”[55]
The JIC developed this theme in the spring of 1964. It
warned that in the event of a pro-Iraqi coup inside Kuwait,
Baghdad “might well find it politically difficult to resist moving
their existing forces in the Basrah/ Zubayr area into Kuwait”
despite the risk of British intervention.[56] The JIC doubted
that London would receive much warning of a coup, much to
the concern of the Prime Minister, who commented, “The
lack of warning is rather disturbing. Have we informed the
ruler? What is the intelligence system doing inside Kuwait so
that the internal situation can be watched?”[57] The JIC
subsequently expanded on the assessment, concluding:
The Iraqis would be unlikely to launch an opportunist attack
unless they estimated that they could establish control in
Kuwait before British troops intervened…. Although Iraqi and
Egyptian opportunities for subversion in Kuwait will increase,
the chances of a successful coup against the Amir are low,
and we believe that there is a good chance of obtaining
timely knowledge of internal unrest, which might lead to a
revolt, from sources within Kuwait but there can be no
guarantee of significant warning of the actual start of a coup
d’état.[58]
This assessment prompted the British to revise military
planning to focus more on coup suppression as a way to
forestall an Iraqi invasion. The JIC was asked to respond to a
comprehensive set of questions on Kuwaiti instability,
including what forms a coup might take, what kind of political
or tactical warning could be expected, and how fast the Iraqi
ground and air forces in the Basrah/Zubayr area could react.
The JIC response that summer was discouraging. Again, it
was pointed out that, “There is a good chance of obtaining
timely knowledge of internal unrest which might lead to a
revolt from sources within Kuwait, but there can be no
certainty of this, nor can there be any guarantee of significant
warning of the actual start of a coup. Moreover, periods of
tension indicating the possibility might last for months.”[59]
[Top of page]
Winding Down in the Gulf
In the fall of 1968, the Chiefs of Staff issued a report on the
anticipated Iraqi threat through the end of 1971 when UK
forces would withdraw. They concluded that any form of Iraqi
attack was unlikely as long as the Gulf remained stable
elsewhere. Baghdad’s own internal tensions, the attitude of
other Arab states, Kuwait’s international status, and the UK’s
defense commitment would dissuade Iraq from invading its
neighbor. Citing a JIC Assessment, the Chiefs of Staff still
identified instability in Kuwait as a residual worry. The report
pointed out that an Arab-Iran confrontation might trigger
instability in Kuwait and increase the likelihood of an Iraqi
attack. It concluded that the Kuwaiti ruling family should be
able to control domestic opposition. In the unlikely event that
the Sabahs were unable to suppress opposition and the
Kuwaiti military had to quell serious unrest, however, Iraq
might be able to seize Kuwait using only forces stationed
near Al Basrah, along with air support. Such a seizure might
occur before the UK could intervene effectively. Once again,
the intelligence warning was qualified: “Serious unrest in
Kuwait should alert us to this possibility in time…[but] there is
no guarantee of this.”[60]
As of October 1968, Iraq still had only one infantry brigade
and one tank battalion near the border with Kuwait that could
make a swift attack along the lines of the “opportunist”
scenario. These units, however, could be supported by a
growing air force. IL28s and TU‑16s operating from
Habbaniyah (near Baghdad) and about 60 percent of Iraqi
fighter force—as many as 229 fighters—could deploy to the
Basrah/Zubayr area on short notice. On the ground, the
growing Kuwaiti Air Force “should” be able to delay the
attack, although the Chiefs of Staff characterized its
defensive capability as “mediocre.” The Ministry of Defence
ruled out the more daunting scenario—a full‑scale attack by
at least one infantry division and an armored brigade—as
long as Iraq’s problems in Kurdisan and Arab-Israeli tensions
remained unsettled.[61]
By mid-1970, however, the JIC reported that the Iraqi military
presence along the border with Kuwait had increased to one
mechanized infantry brigade, twoarmored regiments (90
tanks), and “ample” artillery support. Some 70 ground attack
fighters and nearly 60 air defense fighters along with 19
TU‑16s and IL-28s represented the air threat. Kuwait, with
two infantry brigades and one armored brigade, was judged
likely to be hard pressed to stop even the “opportunist”
attack that British intelligence had envisioned.[62] Despite
these conclusions, indicators of imminent danger were not
present and British troops left the Gulf in 1971 as planned.
[Top of page]
Intelligence and Decisionmaking
The UK intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination
system allowed British forces to posture appropriately to
counter threats of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Of key
importance, UK leaders were predisposed to heed
intelligence warnings. The Persian Gulf had long been on
Whitehall’s watch list, because of UK oil interests and the
legacy of decades of Britain’s indirect rule in the Gulf.
London, for example, had considered sending troops to
Kuwait in July 1958, when the Qasim coup occurred. In other
words, the Middle East command was spring-loaded to enter
Kuwait—with or without an Iraqi invasion—and was keenly
attuned to intelligence reporting. The sudden change in Iraqi
rhetoric toward Kuwait immediately after the AngloKuwaiti
exchange of letters in mid-1961 propelled UK
decisionmakers into action, despite the ambiguous HUMINT
reports of limited force movements at the time.
The JIC’s warning capabilities were handicapped by limited
collection assets, but at the same time bolstered by the
relatively straightforward ground warning problem it faced in
the Gulf. Assessing Baghdad’s capabilities was not
complicated: its army was militarily unready, static, tied down
in providing internal security services, and eventually mired
in protracted warfare in Kurdistan. Most force moves took
place gradually, allowing British decisionmakers time to react.
The UK warning construct remained relatively simple as long
as few Iraqi units were located near Kuwait.
Gauging Baghdad’s intentions was far more difficult,
particularly following the seizure of power by mercurial elites.
Considering a bolt‑from-the-blue scenario bereft of other
indicators, the JIC was convinced that the handful of forces
along the border could cross into Kuwait before detection.
Also, analysts were not sanguine about their ability to warn of
a Kuwaiti coup that might trigger such an invasion.
JIC Assessments in the 1960s appear to have enjoyed high
credibility within the British military establishment. The
warning timelines they provided were central to UK military
planning to defend Kuwait for over a decade.
[Top of page]
[1. Selected declassified records up to 1970 are available in
the Public Records Office (PRO) in Kew Gardens, outside
London.Citations in parentheses, such as (DEFE 13/268), link
to the relevant folder or bound volume in the PRO. Additional
primary sources, up to 1965, have been published in: A. De
L. Rush, Records of Kuwait, 1899-1961, Foreign Affairs II
(Slough: Archive
Edition, 1989), and Anita L.P. Burdett, Records of Kuwait
1961-1965 (Slough: Archive Edition, 1997). Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1958-1960, Near East Region, Volume
XII (hereafter FRUS), provides the US perspective on Britain
in the Gulf during the early Qasim period.
[2. Richard Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and
Territorial Disputes (London: Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1991), pp. 58-90.
[3. Miriam Joyce, Kuwait 1945-1966: An Anglo-American
Perspective (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998).
[4. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO), Central
Intelligence Machinery (London: HMSO, 1996). Many JIC
documents on the Iraqi threat to Kuwait through 1962 are
declassified in full; beyond that year, JIC papers are often
paraphrased in Chiefs of Staff correspondence and minutes.
[5. Chiefs of Staff Committee, “Confidential Annex” to
meeting of 7 November 1961, Records of Kuwait 1961-1965,
volume for 1961, (Slough: Archive Edition, 1997), pp.
247-248 (hereafter cited as Records of Kuwait). Chiefs of
Staff (62) 55, meeting minutes, “Iraqi Threat to Kuwait,”
Records of Ministry of Defence (hereafter DEFE) 11/226. The
JIC also produced current intelligence updates on Iraq and
routinely discussed Iraq in its weekly worldwide intelligence
summary
CENTRAL INTELLIGENT AGENCY [6. There is a wealth of UK and US documentation on Anglo-
American planning for military intervention in the Middle
Eastduring 1958. See: message from State Department to
American Embassy London, 31 July 1958; Memorandum
from Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South
Asian, and African Affairs to Secretary of State Dulles, “US
Position Re Actions Required to Hold Persian Gulf Positions
for West,” 23 July 1958; and memorandum of conference
with President Eisenhower, 23 July 1958, all in FRUS, pp.
93-100.
[7. JIC (58) 76, “Immediate Outlook in Iraq,” 5 August 1958,
Records of Cabinet Office (hereafter CAB) 158/33.
[8. Minutes from JIC meeting, 13 August 1958 (CAB
159/30).
[9. See confidential annex to Chiefs of Staff Committee
meeting, “Damage to Kuwait,” 22 July 1958; and “Military
Implicationsof Extended Operations in the Middle East,” 21
July 1958, both in DEFE 4/109. Also, JIC (59) 21, “Military
Intervention in Iraq,” 9 February 1959 (CAB 158/35).
[10. JIC (59) 28, terms of reference for JIC paper on the
Iraqi threat, 6 March 1959 (CAB 158/36).
[11. Ibid.
[12. JIC (59) 28, “Assessment of the Iraqi Threat to Kuwait,”
30 April 1959 (CAB 158/36).
[13. Memo from Secretary of JIC, “Outlook for Iraq over the
Next Twelve Months,” 14 December 1960 (CAB 158/42); and
JICAssessment, “Outlook for Iraq over the Next Twelve
Months,” JIC (61) 10, 15 March 1961 (CAB 158/42).
[14. JIC Assessment of 15 March 1961. Also, JIC
Assessment, “Iraqi Threat to Kuwait During the Next Twelve
Months,” JIC (61)58, 18 August 1961 (CAB 158/44).
[15. JIC Assessment, “Iraqi Threat to Kuwait During the
Next Twelve Months,” JIC (61) 58, 18 August 1961 (CAB
158/44).
[16. Humphrey Trevelyan, The Middle East in Revolution
(London: Northumberland Press, 1970), pp. 187-192.
[17. Message from Foreign Office to UK Mission at UN, 1
July 1961, Records of Kuwait, volume for 1961, pp. 272-273).
[18. Trevelyan, pp. 188-189.
[19. Message from UK Political Resident in Bahrain to
Foreign Office, 29 June 1961, Records of Kuwait, volume for
1961, pp. 261262.
[20. Minutes from JIC meeting of 29 June 1961 (CAB
159/35). Relying heavily on archives in the PRO, Morice
Snell-Mendozawrote an excellent summary of these events in
“The Defence of Oil: Britain’s Response to the Iraqi Threat
towards Kuwait, 1961,” Contemporary British History
(Autumn 1966), pp. 35-62. M. Alani also produced a
comprehensive study of the intervention in Operation
Vantage— British Military Intervention in Kuwait 1961
(Surrey: LAAM, 1990).
[21. Trevelyan, p. 189. Also, CINC MIDEAST’s weekly sitrep,
13 July 1961 (CAB 21/4860).
[22. Record of JIC meeting addressing threat to Kuwait, 15
July 1961 (CAB 159/35). JIC Assessment, “Iraqi Threat to
KuwaitDuring the Next Twelve Months,” JIC (61) 58, 18
August 1961 (CAB 158/44).
[23. JIC Assessment, “Iraqi Threat to Kuwait During the
Next Twelve Months,” JIC (61) 58, 18 August 1961 (CAB
158/44).
[24. Ibid.
[25. Ibid.
[26. Ibid.
[27. Ibid. [28] Ibid.
[29. Chiefs of Staff Committee minutes, 12 September 1961,
Records of Kuwait, volume for 1961, p. 225.
[30. Memo from Secretary of Cabinet to Prime Minister,
“Intelligence on Kuwait,” 12 January 1962 (DEFE 13/268).
Annex toChiefs of Staff (hereafter COS) memo (60) 6, “Air
Reconnaissance in the Basrah/Kuwait Area,” 12 January
1962 (DEFE 5/99).
[31. Confidential annex to JIC meeting, 5 October 1961
(CAB 159/36). Confidential annex to JIC meeting, 12 October
1961 (CAB159/36). Minutes from JIC meeting, 9 November
1961 (CAB 159/36).
[32. JIC Assessment, “Iraqi Threat to Kuwait,” JIC (61) 88,
23 November 1961 (CAB 158/44).
[33. Memo from Secretary of Cabinet to Prime Minister,
“Intelligence on Iraq,” 12 January 1962 (DEFE 13/268).
[34. Ibid.
[35. Ibid. Also, memo from P. De Zulueta in Prime Minister’s
Office to Cabinet Office, 15 January 1962 (DEFE 13/268).
[36. Memo from Prime Minister’s Office, 15 January 1962
(DEFE 13/268).
[37. Memo from Secretary of Cabinet to Prime Minister,
“Intelligence on Iraq,” 12 January 1962 (DEFE 13/268).
Memo from
Secretary of Cabinet to Prime Minister, “Intelligence on Iraq,”
9 February 1962 (DEFE 13/268). Memo from Prime Minister’s
Office, 15 January 1962. Memo from Personal Secretary (PS)
to Undersecretary of State, 21 May 1964 (DEFE 13/268).
Memo from PS to Undersecretary of State, 21 May 1964
(DEFE 13/268). See also: David Lee, Flight from the Middle
East (London: HMSO, 1980), p. 258.
[38. Minutes from JIC meeting, 9 November 1961 (CAB
159/36).
[39. JIC Assessment, “Iraqi Threat to Kuwait,” JIC (61) 88,
23 November 1961 (CAB 158/44). Minutes of COS
Committeemeeting, 28 November 1961, Records of Kuwait,
volume for 1961, pp. 252-254.
[40. Minutes from JIC Meeting, 22 March 1962 (CAB
159/37); and JIC Assessment, “Iraqi Threat to Kuwait in the
Next SixMonths,” JIC (62) 87, 30 November 1962 (CAB
158/47).
[41. Memo from Chief of Defence Staff to Prime Minister,
“Kuwait-Readiness for Intervention,” 28 March 1962.
[42. JIC Assessment, “Iraqi Threat to Kuwait in the Next Six
Months,” JIC (62) 87, 30 November 1962 (CAB 158/47).
[43. Cabinet level assessment of Iraqi threat and UK
collection posture, 22 December 1961, Records of the Prime
Minister’s Office (PREM) 11/4359.
[44. Message from Cabinet Office to operational staffs
including the Middle East Command, 26 December 1961
(PREM11/4359).
[45. Cabinet-level assessment, 22 December 1961.
[46. Message from UK Embassy/Baghdad to Foreign Office,
22 December 1961 (PREM 11/4359).
[47. Cabinet-level assessment, 22 December 1961.
Message from Cabinet Office, 26 December 1961.
[48. Message from UK Political Representative to Foreign
Office, 27 December 1961 (PREM 11/4359).
[49. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs to Under Secretary of
State forPolitical Affairs, “United States Responses to Tension
Regarding Kuwait,” 29 December 1961, FRUS, vol. XVII,
1961-1962, Near East, pp. 376-377.
[50. Memo from Mr. Hockaday (Ministry of Defence) to T.J.
Bligh (Prime Minister’s Office), 2 April 1963 (PREM 11/4359).
[51. Extract from Chiefs of Staff 71st meeting, “The Threat
to Kuwait,” December 1963 (DEFE 11/226), and note to
Minister,“Threat to Kuwait” (DEFE 7/2122).
[52. See also memo to Minister entitled, “The Threat to
Kuwait,” December 1963 (DEFE 7/2122).
[53. Memo to Defence Minister for use in the Defence and
Overseas Policy Committee, 18 December 1963 (DEFE
13/268).
[54. Letter from UK Embassy/Kuwait to Foreign Office, 20
September 1964, Records of Kuwait, 1961-1965, volume for
1964, p. 155. Message from CINC MIDEAST to Minister of
Defence, 6 October 1964 (DEFE 13/268). Letter from British
Embassy/Kuwait to Foreign Office, 19 October 1964, Records
of Kuwait 1961-1965, volume for 1964, p. 134. Letter from
British Embassy/Kuwait to Foreign Office, 14 October 1964,
Records of Kuwait 1961-1965, volume for 1964, p.133.
[55. Memo to Minister, “The Threat to Kuwait” (DEFE
13/268).
SCIENTIFEC INTELLIGENT SERVICES 